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Proposed: A Specialized Statutory
Immigration Court
MAURICE A. ROBERTS*
The retired Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals ex-
amines the mechanisms for formal adjudication of excludability
and deportability under our immigration and nationality laws.
Analyzing the shortcomings which contribute to the system's mal-
functioning, he concludes that a prime factor is the conflicting
roles played by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Af-
ter reviewing various alternative structures which would remove
such determinations from Service control, Mr. Roberts proposes a
tribunal completely outside the Department of Justice--a special-
ized statutory article I immigration court, with trial and appel-
late divisions--and presents a draft of a statute to create it.
INTODUCTION
Some years ago, in an article devoted to an examination of the
increasingly important role and the expanded needs of the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA), I concluded with a recommenda-
tion that the Board should be given statutory recognition and a
more realistic salary classification, and that its members should
be Presidential appointees confirmed by the Senate.1 Recently
confronted with a request to draft a bill to effectuate that recom-
mendation, I find that intervening developments require a some-
what more expansive approach to the problem.
The Board, after all, merely writes the last act, administratively,
in a drama that had its beginnings long before the case reached
that tribunal. In the most important proceedings coming before
the Board for adjudication, those involving the exclusion and ex-
* Editor, Interpreter Releases, American Council for Nationalities Service.
J.D., Rutgers University Law School, 1932. Mr. Roberts served as Chairman of the
Board of Immigration Appeals, United States Department of Justice, from 1968 to
1974 and as Head of the Immigration Litigation Unit, Criminal Division, United
States Department of Justice, from 1965 to 1968.
1. See Roberts, The Board of Immigration Appeals: A Critical Appraisal, 15
SAN DiEGo L. REv. 29, 43-44 (1977).
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pulsion of aliens, the charges have been laid, the issues framed,
the evidence presented and the adjudication made in a trial
before an immigration judge.2 It is his3 decision, based on the
record made before him, that the BIA reviews. Recent disclo-
sures, made before the Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy 4 and elsewhere, present a picture that casts grave
doubt on the adequacy of the entire structure. I am now satisfied
that it would be futile to concentrate only on the Board when the
overall system itself seems badly in need of reappraisal and over-
haul.
It will be the purpose of this article to analyze the existing
mechanisms for formal adjudication of excludability and de-
portability under our immigration and nationality laws, examine
their shortcomings, and present feasible alternatives.
THE EXISTING SYSTEM
It is becoming increasingly apparent that the present system of
decision-making under the immigration and nationality laws sim-
ply isn't working. This malfunction is due, in part, to the fre-
quently conflicting roles which must be played by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the agency
charged by the statute with the bulk of the decision-making.5 For
one thing, the statutory provisions themselves are exceedingly
technical and complex, and become increasingly so. From simple
beginnings, the statutory grounds for exclusion and deportation
have multiplied and prolifei-ated through the years, followed at in-
tervals by provisions for discretionary amelioration when the full
sweep of the hardship involved has been exposed.6 The result is
2. The statute itself refers to these officials as special inquiry officers. Immi-
gration and Nationality Act §§ 101(b)(4), 235, 236, 242, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(4), 1225,
1226, 1252 (1976). They are now called immigration judges, 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(1) (1980),
and will be so referred to throughout this article.
3. It is easier to refer to "his" than to "his or her," and the use of the mascu-
line form in referring to an immigration judge should be taken as also including
the feminine. Some immigration judges are women.
4. The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (hereinafter
the Select Commission) was created pursuant to the Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L
No. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907 (1978), to study and evaluate existing laws, policies and pro-
cedures governing the admission of immigrants and refugees to the United States
and to make administrative and legislative recommendations to the President and
the Congress. The sixteen-member commission and its staff have held numerous
public hearings and consultations in various parts of the United States. Its final
report is due by March 1, 1981.
5. Immigration and Nationality Act § 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1976); 8 C.F.R. § 2.1
(1980).
6. See Roberts, The Grounds of Deportation Statute of Limitations on Depor-
tation, and Clarsfication of the Nature of Deportation, 57 INMRPRETER RELxAsus
157 (1980).
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a melange of mandates for making decisions which sometimes
casts the Service in the role of prosecutor, sometimes in the role
of judge, and sometimes, alas, in both roles at the same time.
The Immigration and Nationality Act abounds with provisions
for exclusion, deportation, and the imposition of penalties, both
civil7 and criminal.8 These, plus the responsibility for policing the
borders, involve the Service in functions which are essentially of
an enforcement and prosecutorial nature. The bulk of the Serv-
ice's personnel are engaged in enforcement activities of this na-
ture.
In juxtaposition stand the many statutory provisions authoriz-
ing various benefits and forms of relief for citizens and aliens,
which bring into play the public service functions of the INS.
Typical are the provisions for the grant of exemptions and prefer-
ences in the issuance of immigrant visas, based on family reunifi-
cation,9 business needs,' 0 and humanitarian concerns for refugees
and those seeking asylum here." Finally, there are the numerous
provisions for waivers of inadmissibility and relief from deporta-
tion which frequently confront the INS with the need for making
decisions in cases involving a combination of both its enforce-
ment and its service functions.' 2
Coupled with the difficulties inherent in such a dual role is the
7. The grounds for exclusion are stated in Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976 & Supp. II 1979); for deportation, in § 241(a), 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979). Civil penalties of an administrative nature
are prescribed in Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 231, 233, 237, 239, 243, 251, 254,
255, 256, 271, 272, 273, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221, 1223, 1227, 1229, 1281, 1284, 1285, 1286, 1321,
1322, 1323 (1976), 1253 (1976, Supp. I 1979 & Supp. IV 1980).
8. Criminal violations are spelled out in Immigration and Nationality Act
§§ 266, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1306, 1325, 1326, 1327, 1328 (1976), 1324 (1976
& Supp. 1I 1979), as well as in various provisions of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 371 (conspiracy), 911 (false claim to United States citizenship), 1001 (false state-
ments to government officers), 1546 (falsification or misuse of entry documents),
1621 (peijury) (1976).
9. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 201(b), 202(b), 203, 204, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1151(b), 1152(b)(1976), 1153, 1154 (1976 & Supp. II 1979).
10. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 101(a) (15) (E), (H), 203(a) (3), (6), 204,
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a) (15) (E), (H) (1976), 1153(a) (3), (6) (1976 & Supp. I 1979), 1154
(Supp. I 1979).
11. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 207, 208, 209, 243(h), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157,
1158, 1159, 1253(h) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-212, 94 Stat 102.
12. Immigration and Nationality Act §§,211(b), 212(b), (c), (d), (e), (g), (h),
(i), (j), 213, 244, 245, 248, 249, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1181(b) (1976), 1182(b), (c), (d), (e), (g),
(h), (i), (j) (1976 & Supp. I 1979), 1183 (1976), 1254 (1976 & Supp. MI 1979), 1255,
1258, 1259 (1976).
undeniable fact that Congress has provided the Service with little
real support in carrying out its conflicting and sometimes irrecon-
cilable duties. For example, in the Act, as enacted in 1952, and in
the patchwork of amendments which followed,' 3 Congress has re-
flected no clear immigration policy. This failure has made it nec-
essary for the Service (and the BIA on appeal) to improvise and
make ad hoc determinations, shifting positions from time to time
as best seemed to suit the needs of the moment.14 The most dra-
matic evidence of the congressional failure to provide a clear im-
migration policy is the fact that in recent years the INS has not
been given resources adequate to cope with the proliferating
13. Since enactment of the basic Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952, sig-
nificant amendments have been made (singly or in batches) in 1953, 1954, 1956,
1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1965, 1966, 1970, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980.
14. Illustrative is the administrative position with respect to out-of-wedlock
children as stepchildren. The precise question is whether and under what circum-
stances an alien's illegitimate child can be considered the stepchild of his spouse.
The problem arose because under Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 101(b) (1) (D), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (D) (1976), an illegitimate child can claim or
confer immigration benefits only in relation to its natural mother and not in rela-
tion to its natural father. This discrimination has been sustained by the Supreme
Court. Fallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). A remedy was fashioned years ago in Na-
tion v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), where the court recognized the
spouse of the natural father as the child's stepmother within the meaning of Immi-
gration and Nationality Act § 101(b) (1) (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(B) (1976), when
the three had lived together in a close family unit. The Service did not appeal that
decision and the BIA accepted it as a rule of general applicability, over Service ob-
jection. In re The, 11 L & N. Dec. 449 (1965). However, when the same court in
Andrade v. Esperdy, 270 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), extended the Nation rule to
a situation where there had never been a close family unit, the Board balked and
refused to apply that holding in cases outside the jurisdiction of the court that ren-
dered it. In re Harris, LD. No. 2308 (1974); In re Amado and Monteiro, 13 I. & N.
Dec. 179 (1969); In re Soares, 12 I. & N. Dec. 653 (1968).
After a number of years had passed without any further court ruling on the is-
sue, the INS changed its position. In a memorandum dated December 11, 1978, in
In re Moreira, File No. A 22 211 458 (Dec. 11, 1978), the Service recommended to
the BIA that the Andrade rule should be applied nationwide. Without committing
itself, the Board in an unreported order dated January 5, 1979, remanded the case
to the INS for reconsideration in light of the new Service position. 56 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 12 (1979). Both the Service and counsel sought reconsideration, urging
the Board to overrule its prior precedents to the contrary (which are binding on
the Service) and come out with a new precedent decision accepting the Andrade
formulation. In the interim, another court in an unpublished opinion had endor-
sed Andrade. Hyppolite v. Sweeney, Civ. No. 77-1865 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 1979), re-
ported in 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES 62 (1979). The Board's response was its
published precedent decisions in In re Moreira [Moreira I], LD. No. 2720 (1979),
and In re Moreira [Moreira II], LD. No. 2792 (1980), in which, far from accepting
the INS position, it placed a new gloss on Andrade. The Service codified the new
Moreira standards in an amendment to its regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c) (3), (5),
45 Fed. Reg. 41392 (1980). Since then, however, the first court of appeals to con-
sider the issue has rejected the Board's new gloss on the meaning of "stepchild"
in Moreira I and has endorsed the holdings in Andrade and Hyppolite. See
Palmer v. Reddy, 622 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1980). The Board at first applied that ruling
only in cases arising in the Ninth Circuit, In re Bonnette, I.D. No. 2840 (1980), but
has now accepted it nationwide, In re McMillan, LD. No. 2844 (1981).
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problems engendered in both its enforcement and service func-
tions. The study now in process by the Select Commission should
yield some meaningful policy guidelines for congressional consid-
eration. But unless Congress provides sufficient funding to carry
out the policies seemingly manifest in its legislation, it is a fair in-
ference that Congress does not really intend those policies to be
carried out. Effective administration of the laws, whether by way
of enforcement or the delivery of services, cannot thrive under
such conditions.
Some of the fault may properly be attributed to indifference on
the part of the Service's parent organization, the United States
Department of Justice. Although the INS has been part of that
Department for forty years, departmental interest has been fo-
cused largely on components with greater "sex appeal,"-the
F.B.I., the Antitrust Division and the Criminal Division, for exam-
ple. Until relatively recently, when the subject matter of its
problems became more newsworthy (undocumented aliens, Ira-
nian students, refugees), the INS has been afflicted with a severe
case of benign neglect. I very much doubt that any Attorney Gen-
eral in recent years would have suffered a real feeling of loss if
the immigration function were taken out of the Department of
Justice and assigned to some other agency of the government.
The inadequacy of INS resources to meet both its enforcement
and its public service responsibilities has caused unwarranted
backlogs in both areas as emphasis has shifted from time to time
between both functions.'5 This enforcement/service dichotomy
has only aggravated an already bad situation and intensified seri-
ous morale problems within the INS as competing groups become
more polarized. The enforcement-minded District Directors now
have their own employee organization. The more quasi-judicial
and service-oriented immigration judges have theirs. The inter-
play between the two groups is revealing.
15. Thus, late in 1974, following the onset of the recession and the allegations
that millions of aliens were here illegally and were depriving United States citi-
zens and lawfully resident aliens of jobs, the then INS Commissioner reordered
Service priorities, with increased emphasis on enforcement functions and dimin-
ished emphasis on service functions. 51 INTERPRETER RELEASES 278 (1974); 52 IN-
TERPRETER RELEASES 62 (1975). With a new administration and a new INS
Commissioner, as well as a change in the economic situation, greater resources
were shifted to the delivery of services. 54 INTERPRETER RELEASES 310 (1977); 55
INTERPRETER RELEASES 73 (1978); 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES 462 (1979).
The District Directors
The INS is headed by the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization, who functions from its Central Office in Washing-
ton, D.C.16 Administratively, the INS field service is broken down
into four regions, each headed by a Regional Commissioner. Each
region is further broken down into a number of districts, each
headed by a District Director. It is at the District Office level that
the bulk of the Service's activity takes place;' 7 there, applications
are filed, investigations conducted, adjudications made, inspec-
tions of arriving aliens performed and deportation proceedings
begun. The District Director bears responsibility for all such
Service functions in his district and most Service decisions are
made by, or in the name of, its District Directors.18 Some deci-
sions of District Directors are appealable to the Regional Com-
missioners.' 9 Others are appealable to the BIA.20 Still others are
not subject to appeal, but the denied application may be renewed
before an immigration judge in later deportation proceedings. 2'
Some decisions are not subject to further administrative review
and may be further challenged only by resort to the courts.22 It is
the District Directors who determine, in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, whether a deportation proceeding shall
be initiated and prosecuted to a 6onclusion.23
That the District Directors are imbued with enforcement fervor
should not be surprising. As one commentator put it:
The internal structure and promotional plans of the Service foster the di-
vergent philosophies of law enforcement and service. Border Patrol
Agents become Investigators, become Supervisors, become top Adminis-
trators including District Directors. Naturalization Examiners become
Trial Attorneys, become Special Inquiry Officers or "Judges." While such
a system certainly produces some checks and balances it pits one school
against another.2 4
16. Immigration and Nationality Act § 103(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(b) (1976); 8
C.F.R. § 2.1 (1980). Since the resignation of Commissioner Leonel J. Castillo in
September 1979, there has been a vacancy. During that period INS General Coun-
sel David L. Crosland has served as Acting Commissioner.
17. The Service's uniformed Border Patrol, though functioning on a field office
level, has a separate field organization. 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(r) (1980). Border Patrol
sector headquarters and stations are listed in 8 C.F.R. § 100.4(d) (1980).
18. The jurisdiction of District Directors is set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(n)
(1980).
19. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(m) (1980).
20. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1980).
21. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§ 245.2(a) (4), (d), 249.2 (1980).
22. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 244.2 (1980).
23. Lopez-Telles v. INS, 564 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Vizcarra-Delgadillo,
13 1. & N. Dec. 51 (1968).
24. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR 41 (1980)
(Bruce D. Beaudin, consultant).
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The Immigration Judges
The INS decisions having greatest immediate impact are those
involving the exclusion of aliens seeking admission to the United
States and those involving the expulsion of aliens already within
this country, many of whom have long years of residence and
deep roots here. Decisions of this sort are made by the Service's
immigration judges after trial-type hearings designed to accord
with current concepts of due process. 25
The Service has made tremendous advances since the old days
when exclusion and deportation proceedings were summary af-
fairs, conducted by officers who were neither lawyers nor legally
trained. Exclusion hearings were held before a Board of Special
Inquiry, consisting of three members, one of whom was invariably
a clerk who recorded the proceedings. Deportation proceedings
were conducted before a presiding inspector, usually an Immi-
grant Inspector, who combined prosecutorial and quasi-judicial
functions and might even be the person who had investigated the
case, assembled the evidence, and recommended the initiation of
the deportation proceedings.26 Responding to criticism contained
in the report of the Wickersham Commission in 193127 and the
Secretary of Labor's Committee on Administrative Procedure in
1939,28 serious attempts at separation of functions were made
once the Service was transferred to the Department of Justice in
1940.29
It was not until the enactment of the Administrative Procedure
Act in 194630 and the Supreme Court's 1950 decision in Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath,31 however, that the need for truly in-
dependent hearing officers was brought squarely home to the
Service. In Wong Yang Sung, the Court held that the Administra-
25. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 236, 242(b), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226, 1252(b)
(1976); 8 C.F.R. §§ 236, 242 (1980).
26. A good description of the former procedure in deportation cases is set
forth in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36-45 (1950).
27. WICKERSHAM CO.mssiON, REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE DEPORTA-
TION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 162 (1931).
28. The INS was then part of the Department of Labor. THE SECRETARY OF LA-
BO'S COIMTTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, THE hIMIGRATION AND NATURALI-
ZATION SERVICE 101 (1940).
29. Reorg. Plan No. 5 of 1940, 5 Fed. Reg. 2,223 (1940).
30. The Administrative Procedure Act is now codified in 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706
(1976 & Supp. m 1979).
31. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
tive Procedure Act's hearing provisions applied to deportation
proceedings and that the Service was not exempt from the re-
quirement that such hearings be conducted by Administrative
Procedure Act hearing examiners. The Service succeeded in
stampeding Congress into exempting exclusion and deportation
proceedings from the Administrative Procedure Act's hearings re-
quirements by insisting that effective immigration law enforce-
ment would otherwise break down. However, the lesson of Wong
Yang Sung, that the Constitution requires a hearing before a tri-
bunal "which meets at least currently prevailing standards of im-
partiality,"32 had been learned. When the Immigration and
Nationality Act was enacted in 1952, its deportation hearing provi-
sions contained sufficient built-in protections to be ultimately sus-
tained as providing the functional equivalent of the
Administrative Procedure Act safeguards.33
The immigration judges are now all lawyers selected through
civil service procedures from among candidates who either have
or acquire civil service status. They are now, and have been for
years, classified for pay purposes in grade GS-15, with a theoreti-
cal salary range of $44,547 to $57,912.34 They have endeavored,
with some success, to achieve the added stature and trappings of
their role models in the judicial branch of government. They wear
robes, refer to their tribunal as the "immigration court," and are
in theory relatively free from undue influence by the District Di-
rectors and other enforcement officials in their decision-making.
When it comes to the realities, however, the immigration judges
are far from free. Despite their semi-autonomous status, they are
directly dependent on the District Directors, and indirectly on the
Regional Commissioners, for office space, hearing facilities, equip-
ment, supplies, clerical and transcription support, interpreter
service, travel authorization and reimbursement, library and re-
search facilities, calendars, maintenance of case files, and other
services. In determining what portion of their limited resources
they can afford to allocate to the needs of the immigration judges,
the District Directors are subject to a number of influences which
tend to depreciate the importance of those needs.
For one thing, in many areas there is hostility and suspicion be-
tween the District Directors and their enforcement officers on the
one hand, and the immigration judges on the other. Many District
Directors evidently view the immigration judges as pushy intrud-
32. Id. at 50.
33. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
34. The range is theoretical because Congress has imposed a flat limit of
$50,112.50.
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ers whose demands in the name of due process only obstruct the
Service mission. Thus, a memorandum by the Association of Im-
migration Directors of its December 14, 1977 conference with then
INS Commissioner Castillo contemptuously refers to the robes of
the immigration judges as the "black nightgowns they frequently
wear when conducting hearings," and states:
Special Inquiry Officers, aka "Immigration Judges" (8 CFR 1.1(1)) and the
evolution of the complicated hearings function by rule making particularly
since issuance of 8 CFR 1.1(1) on April 4, 1973, which made use of the term
judge permissable [sic] in lieu of special inquiry officer. It was pointed
out that no individual change added to SIO authority to veto decisional
authority historically excercised [sic] by DIDIR's was, in itself, of major
significance, but that in the aggregate the many changes had resulted in
creation of a complex legal bureacracy [sic] that hindered Service mission
accomplishment, increased costs and was of more benefit to the legal
trade than to the aliens.35
This unflattering perception of the immigration judges by many
District Directors is further confirmed by the following testimony
delivered before the Select Commission in April 1980 on behalf of
the Association of Immigration Directors:
The need for economy and efficiency in the delivery of public service dic-
tates a review of the statutory basis, if any, for the costly and inefficient
system of so-called "Immigration Courts" and "Immigration Judges" that
seems to have been dictated by the cry for due process... [T]he system
as it has developed over the past decade particularly, has gone from a rel-
atively simple but complete "lay" hearing to a most complex legal
bureacracy [sic] serving only to confuse and make it costly to the aliens
and the government in the process. 36
These antagonistic attitudes are not lost on the immigration
judges. "It is now clear," one immigration judge wrote to the Se-
lect Commission, "that these Directors and their subordinates
view our role as renegade Immigration Officers who are usurpers
of authority and frauds in our role as Judges. When one under-
stands that this is their position, one can understand the whyfor
[sic] of these many manifestations of disrespect toward us."3 7
Letters to the Select Commission from immigration judges in dif-
ferent parts of the United States relate various types of provaca-
tive meddling on the part of enforcement personnel into their
operations. "Fair and impartial hearings are not possible," re-
ported another immigration judge to the Select Commission,
35. SELECT COMMISSION ON INNIGRATION AND REFUGEE PoLIcY, IMIIGRATION
HEARINGS AND APPEALs: A STRUCTURAL STUDY 2 (1980) (unpublished report by Pe-
ter Levinson on file with the Select Commission).
36. Id. at 2-3.
37. Id. at 3-4
"when one of the parties in each case controls the court system."
He further asserted that "[tihe strong desire to influence the
judges directly or indirectly is repugnantly clear."3 8
Added to these attitudinal factors, malicious or subconscious,
which might make a District Director feel righteously justified in
restricting to a bare minimum the resources made available to im-
migration judges, is the undoubted element of self-interest. When
it comes to the allocation of budgetary resources for the process-
ing of deportation cases, the District Directors and the immigra-
tion judges have different perceptions of the priorities. As the
former Chief Immigration Judge testified:
First of all, the district director is a law enforcement officer, and as such,
when he institutes proceedings against an alien, he is interested in seeing
that it is carried through to a successful conclusion; otherwise he would
not have instituted the proceedings in the beginning. The immigration
judge, on the other hand, takes no stand either way, either for the Service
or for the alien.
Secondly, the priorities arise because the district director has no responsi-
bility for the immigration judge's activity. If the immigration judge's activ-
ity is very successful, the district director gets no credit. If it is
unsuccessful, if it is very poor, he gets no blame. So, on the other hand, if
his investigative staff does a poor job, he gets blamed for that. If his adju-
dicators fall behind, he will get complaints from Members of Congress and
from members of the public. 39
Apart from the petty annoyances and inconveniences to immi-
gration judges inadequately provisioned by the District Directors,
such a lack of needed resources can directly impede the entire
deportation process. For example, absence of the clerical support
needed to transcribe a deportation hearing automatically delays
the decision in many cases. Immigration judges ordinarily deliver
an oral decision at the end of the hearing. However, if the case is
such that a printed form order cannot be used,40 the oral decision
must be transcribed. In cases having large records or complex le-
gal issues, an immigration judge may reserve decision and await a
transcript of the hearing before formulating his opinion. In such
cases, lack of clerical facilities is an obvious obstacle to prompt
disposition of pending cases.
Where there is no appeal from an immigration judge's decision,
there is usually no need to transcribe the hearings. However,
where there is an appeal to the BIA, ordinarily the hearing is
transcribed before the record on appeal is transmitted to the
Board. Since there is an automatic stay of deportation pending
38. Id. at 4.
39. U.S. CorMMIussIoN ON Cvum RiGHiTs, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR 110-11
(1980) (statement of Herman Bookford, Chief Immigration Judge).
40. Summary decisions on printed form orders are authorized in some in-
stances by 8 C.F.R. § 242.18(b) (1980).
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the appeal,4 1 delay in transcribing the hearing necessarily causes
delay in the ultimate consideration and disposition of the appeal.
As far back as 1972, the BIA noted the acute clerical shortage in
some INS districts and the opportunities available to obtain sub-
stantial delay in frivolous cases by the simple expedient of filing
an ingeniously contrived notice of appeal.42 The Board suggested
administrative shortcuts, including the possibility of dispensing
with the transcript in appropriate cases. When there is a dispute
between the immigration judge and the District Director as to
whether a record on appeal should be transcribed, the District Di-
rector's control of the clerical resources determines the result, at
least until the Board intervenes. 43 But even in the absence of an
appeal, clerical help is needed to transcribe an immigration
judge's oral opinion or to type his written decision.
The situation is further complicated by the absence of an appro-
priate conduit for the provisioning and support of the immigration
judges. True, administrative regulations provide for a Chief Im-
migration Judge in the INS headquarters office in Washington,
D.C., who is charged with the general supervision and direction of
the immigration judges and with scheduling the various proceed-
ings assigned to them.4 4 But even that small degree of support is
no longer available. The last Chief Immigration Judge retired
over a year ago and the vacancy has not been filled. Instead, over
the objections of the National Association of United States Immi-
gration Judges, the immigration judges have been placed under
the administrative supervision of the INS Regional Commission-
ers.
It is high time that the adjudication of exclusion and deporta-
tion proceedings be removed entirely from the Service. The adju-
dicators, by whatever name they are called, should be placed in a
position where they can hear and decide the cases fairly and
promptly, free from dependence on and influence by enforcement
41. 8 C.F.R. § 3.6 (1980).
42. In re Gamboa, 14 L & N. Dec. 244 (1972); see also In re Lopez, 14 I. & N. Dec.
424 (1973).
43. See, e.g., In re Holani, LD. No. 2804 (1980), in which an appeal from an im-
migration judge's exclusion order was frustrated for over a year by the District Di-
rector's refusal to accede to the immigration judge's request for transcription of
the hearing and his oral decision. The BIA remanded for completion of the record
without deciding the merits.
44. 8 C.F.R. 103.1(f) (1980).
officials.45
The Board of Immigration Appeals
Very little has changed at the Board in the three years since I
made my critical analysis in these pages.46 The Board has been
removed from the administrative supervision of the Deputy Attor-
ney General and placed under the supervision of the Associate
Attorney General.47 Physically, it has been transplanted from the
District of Columbia to nearby Fairfax County, Virginia. It is still,
however, only the creature of regulation, lacking statutory recog-
nition or status. It is still dependent on the Department of Justice
for staffing, housing and provisioning. Its members are still classi-
fied in grade GS-15 and its Chairman in grade GS-16. It is still
theoretically independent of the influence of enforcement officials
in its decision-making, but in that regard a small cloud has re-
cently appeared.48
45. The Service's insensitivity to the needs of the adjudicatory process as op-
posed to enforcement needs is nowhere better illustrated than in its indifference
to the dissemination of precedent-setting decisions. Both the Service and the BIA,
within their respective jurisdictions, make adjudications which are administra-
tively final. Selected opinions, designed to be both informative and binding as
precedents, are from time to time designated for publication. Provision for
designation of INS decisions as precedent is contained in 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(e)
(1980). BIA decisions are covered by 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (1980). Publication is pro-
vided for in 8 C.F.R. § 103.9(a) (1980). These decisions appear initially in slip form
as serially numbered Interim Decisions and are ultimately published in bound
volumes entitled Administrative Decisions Under Immigration and Nationality
Laws of the United States (I. & N. Dec.). The decisions are followed carefully, not
only by INS and BIA personnel, but also by other government agencies and pri-
vate practitioners who must keep abreast of such developments. Until recently,
the Service had responsibility for actual publication of these precedent-setting de-
cisions. It failed abysmally, largely through niggardliness in making adequate re-
sources available. Finally, this responsibility was removed from the Service and
entrusted to the BIA. Volume 16 of the Decisions, the first one chargeable to the
BIA, has recently been published. Meanwhile, Volume 15, which is still the Serv-
ice's responsibility and should contain Interim Decisions 2301 through 2525, desig-
nated for publication as precedents during the period 1974-1976, has yet to make
its appearance. To make matters worse, even in the publication of the slip opin-
ions themselves the Service has been guilty of unexplained delay. Interim Deci-
sions Nos. 2757 through 2774, important Service precedent decisions dated from
August 26, 1977 to January 18, 1980, were not printed and distributed until the sum-
mer of 1980.
46. See Roberts, The Board of Immigration Appeals: A Critical Appraisal, 15
SAN DrNGo L. REV. 29 (1977).
47. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a), as amended, 45 Fed. Reg. 9893 (1980).
48. In Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), the Court held that under
the regulations the Attorney General cannot dictate the actions of the BIA. Fol-
lowing that decision, the Attorney General, in Order 45-54 of April 23, 1954, di-
rected the Board and all other subordinates of the Attorney General to exercise
their own independent judgment in deciding cases, and to exercise discretion "on
the basis of their own understanding and conscience directed by the facts of each
individual case, uninfluenced by any extraneous statements by persons official or
unofficial." 1 C. GORDON & IL ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAw AND PROCEDURE 1-79
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Apart from its lack of statutory recognition, a number of addi-
tional disadvantages inherent in the Board's present posture have
recently come to the fore. These must be seriously addressed in
any critical appraisal of the Board. For instance, no longer do the
majority of Board cases originate on the eastern seaboard. The
center of gravity has shifted sharply. Immigration cases now
spring up in profusion all over the country, and immigration prac-
titioners may now be found not only in the large centers of popu-
lation on both coasts but also in the Midwest. The opportunity for
ready access to the Board for oral argument on the part of practi-
tioners outside the Washington, D.C. area is becoming a real need
which the Board, as now constituted, cannot fill.
Moreover, constitutional challenges to the immigration and na-
tionality laws, to which the Supreme Court has recently opened
the door a chink,49 may not be entertained by the Board. The
Board has consistently held that it lacks power to adjudicate such
issues.5 0 Even more important, the Board's role as final adminis-
trative arbiter in settling all questions of law on a national level
has been seriously undermined in recent years by sectional differ-
ences among the courts on review of Board decisions. The Board
n.68 (rev. ed. 1980). Recently, in In re Sandoval, LD. No. 2725 (1979), the Board de-
parted from its prior course of decisions and held that the exclusionary rule does
not apply in deportation proceedings because they are civil in nature. Dissenting
in part, Board Member Appleman made the following disquieting point:
The rule having been accepted and followed for so many years, the nat-
ural inquiry is-what reason is there for a change now? The majority deci-
sion fails to answer this satisfactorily. The Service has advanced no
argument for a change beyond mere reliance on the civil nature of depor-
tation proceedings, and advice that, according to a memorandum of the
Associate Attorney General, the Department of Justice is adopting, gener-
ally, the rule which the Service is now urging upon us. We, of course, are
not bound by the enunciation of position of the Associate Attorney Gen-
eral. See U.S. ex rel Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
49. The Supreme Court has consistently held that in legislating on the classes
of aliens who may enter and remain in the United States, Congress exercises
political judgment which is immune from judicial scrutiny. Recently, however, the
Court stated: "Our cases reflect acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility
under the Constitution even with respect to the power of Congress to regulate the
admission and exclusion of aliens .... " Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 n.5 (1977).
No case was cited for this proposition. In Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976),
the court construed Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)
(1976), as providing relief for aliens who had not departed from the United States,
on the theory that to do otherwise would render the provision vulnerable as a de-
nial of equal protection.
50. In re Cortez, 16 L & N. Dec. 289 (1977); In re Chery and Hassan, LD. No.
2405 (1975); In re Lennon, LD. No. 2304 (1974); In re Wong, 13 L & N. Dec. 820
(1971); In re Santana, 13 L & N. Dec. 362 (1969).
has consistently held5' that it is bound to apply the rule of law
laid down by the court in future cases arising within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of that court. As issues of this nature proliferate,
we are being increasingly confronted with situations in which the
Board applies one rule in one geographical area and another rule
in the rest of the country.52
Judicial Review
In recent years, the availability, form, and scope of judicial re-
view have played an increasingly important role in the direction
of immigration law enforcement. Not only do the courts' develop-
ing concepts of due process affect immigration procedures, 3 their
construction of the substantive provisions of the statutes them-
selves has had a marked effect on the direction the law has
taken.54
Because judicial review provides a ready avenue of additional
delay, the Immigration and Nationality Act was amended in 1961
to add section 106(a) providing a statutory form for review of final
deportation orders. This provision was designed to streamline the
mechanics of review by eliminating access to the district courts
altogether. Petitions for review are now filed directly in the
courts of appeals. But not all BIA decisions are thus reviewable.
In deportation cases, habeas corpus in the district court is still
preserved for the alien under official restrait, 5 and for aliens or-
dered excluded it is the sole remedy.5 6 Moreover, Board deci-
51. And rightly so, in my estimation. See Ithaca College v. N.LR.B., 623 F.2d
224 (2d Cir. 1980), and cases cited therein.
52. See, e.g., In re Bonnette, LD. No. 2840 (1980); In re Bowe, LD. No. 2819
(1980); In re Fulgencio, I.D. No. 2816 (1980); In re Cienfuegos, I.D. No. 2746 (1979);
In re Kim, I.D. No. 2735 (1979); In re Anwo, 16 L & N. Dec. 293 (1977); In re Gonza-
lez, 16 L & N. Dec. 134 (1977); In re Amado and Monteiro, 13 L & N. Dec. 179 (1969).
Cf. In re Mangabat, 14 L & N. Dec. 75 (1972) (Board's jurisdiction is nationwide and
a contrary ruling of a lower federal court is not necessarily dispositive).
An additional critical comment on the Board should be noted in passing. One
immigration judge, who formerly, as the BIA Chairman's Executive Assistant/
Chief Attorney Examiner, also served as Alternate Board Member, has recently
questioned both the Board's independence and its competence. He has recom-
mended that the Board be abolished altogether, and that the immigration judge's
decision be the final administrative decision, subject to further review only in the
courts. I cannot agree with this recommendation. In view of the diversity of views
among the 40 immigration judges scattered throughout the United States, there is
a real need for an appellate body such as the Board to harmonize conflicting posi-
tions and provide uniform authority nationwide. At the same time, the nature of
that tribunal (whether it is in the form of a statutory Board or other structure)
should be such as to overcome the deficiencies noted by this critic.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1980).
54. E.g., Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
55. Immigration and Nationality Act § 106(a) (9), 8 U.S.C. § ll05a(a) (9) (1976).
56. Immigration and Nationality Act § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (1976).
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sions on visa petitions, not being final orders of deportation, are
still reviewable in the district courts in actions for declaratory
judgments.57 So also are determinations affecting deportability
made outside the deportation proceedings before the immigration
judge.58
The long-sought elimination of delay by the streamlining of the
judicial review process is not yet at hand. This failure may be at-
tributable, in part at least, to the mounting tide of civil litigation
of all sorts now confronting the federal courts.5 9 In part, it is due
to the increasing complexity of the immigration laws and of the
issues, factual and legal, that must now be dealt with.
Need for a Change
It seems clear that there is an urgent need for some fundamen-
tal changes in the system. Delay is built into the existing struc-
ture.60 District Directors give low priority to the needs of the
immigration judges. The resultant lack of adequate facilities de-
lays hearings and chronic clerical shortages delay transcripts and
opinions. The layering of review, administrative and judicial, and
the multiplicity of opportunities for review open the door to addi-
tional delay.
When it comes to the administrative decision-makers them-
selves, the immigration judges and the BIA members, the ques-
57. Beltre v. Kiley, 470 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd per curiam, 614 F.2d
1285 (2d Cir. 1980).
58. Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968).
59. The overloaded condition of the federal courts is a matter of such common
knowledge that no citation of authorities should be necessary. To meet this
mounting problem, additional judges have been provided, elimination of diversity
jurisdiction is in process, and many innovative ideas are under study. See Huf-
stedler & Nejelsld, A.B.A. Action Commission Challenges Litigation Cost and De-
lay, 66 A.B.A. J. 965 (1980).
60. It should not be supposed that delay is in the best interests of the subject
of the proceedings. Delay as an end in itself can hardly be justified. It is under-
standable that an alien who is clearly deportable and ineligible for any relief from
deportation should want to defer his enforced departure as long as possible, but
that can hardly warrant resort to procedures which are purely dilatory. On the
other hand, undue delay can be prejudicial to many persons who must deal with
the INS. The United States citizen or permanent resident alien who files a visa
petition for a close relative abroad is adversely affected by the delay. So is the
transnatiolal corporation seeking to bring in executive personnel from abroad. So
is the alien here who is seeking, either within or outside deportation proceedings,
to adjust his status to that of a permanent resident, which will enable him not only
to confer preference benefits on close relatives abroad but also to proceed toward
ultimate naturalization.
tion arises whether the time has not come to make changes in the
method of their selection and their placement in an essentially
enforcement agency. Should immigration judges continue to be
recruited almost exclusively from INS personnel with largely
prosecutorial and enforcement backgrounds? In view of the grow-
ing tension between the immigration judges and the District Di-
rectors, shouldn't the immigration judges be completely removed
from the INS? And in view of the apparent indifference of the De-
partment of Justice in immigration matters generally, isn't it time
to consider moving both the immigration judges and the Board
into an environment better adapted to their needs?
SOME ALTERNATIVES
In considering any alternatives to the present system, the weak-
nesses now exposed in the existing apparatus must be taken into
account. To function effectively, any replacement mechanism
must be designed to achieve the following objectives: (1) Quali-
fied personnel. The salary structure and tenure of office should
be in keeping with the great responsibilities involved. The pres-
ent scale of compensation for both immigration judges and BIA
members is wholly out of proportion. The level should be raised
to the point needed to attract and keep lawyers with the high
qualifications required for both the trial and appellate functions.
(2) Independence. The adjudicators must be completely sepa-
rated organizationally from enforcement officials, so that their in-
dependence from prosecutorial influence, direct or indirect, is not
only actual but perceived to be so.61 Public confidence in the fair-
ness of the system will be undermined by anything less. (3) Ade-
quate support. The adjudicators must not only receive the
support services needed for prompt decision-making, but must
also be in a position organizationally to compete effectively for ad-
equate budgets.
The Administrative Procedure Act
One suggested solution would be to amend the Immigration
61. As one commentator aptly put it-
I think it is very much advisable, not only from the standpoint of carrying
out the work efficiently, but from the standpoint of a public view of the
operation. We must not only be independent but we must, I think, give
the appearance of independence. We must convince the aliens, the public,
the members of the bar that our decisions are independent, and when we
are so closely allied with and a part of the Immigration Service, it's very
difficult to convince these people that we are indeed independent.
U.S. CoMMissioN ON CIvIL RxGHTs, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR 111 (1980) (quot-
ing Herman Bookford, Chief Immigration Judge).
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and Nationality Act to require that hearings and decisions in ex-
clusion and deportation cases be committed to administrative law
judges appointed in accordance with the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. Administrative law judges are now widely employed in
the federal establishment. Over a thousand administrative law
judges attached to various federal agencies now carry out quasi-
judicial functions. A more demanding selection and screening
process is applied to candidates for administrative law judge posi-
tions and those selected have greater job security than immigra-
tion judges. Their compensation, promotion and tenure would not
depend on the approval of INS enforcement officials and, in view
of the high level of the responsibilities involved, the pay level as-
signed by the Office of Administrative Law Judges would proba-
bly be set at grade GS-16. Undoubtedly, greater independence
from pressures by INS enforcement officials in their decision-
making would be achieved by administrative law judges and a
higher calibre of adjudication could be expected since the more
exacting administrative law judge standards could be expected to
screen out immigration judges whose present performance is
marginal or less. However, if the administrative law judges re-
mained within the INS and depended on the INS for provisioning
and support, the present intolerable situation would remain. The
only alternative would be to remove the administrative law judges
from the INS entirely and attach them to another entity within or
outside the Department of Justice.
A New Independent Statutory Agency
Another alternative would be to create a new independent stat-
utory agency within the Department of Justice on the model of
the United States Parole Commission. The immigration judges
could be placed within this agency, thereby removing them from
the influence of and dependence on INS enforcement officials.
The BIA could be included within the new agency as an appellate
body, thereby giving it statutory recognition and greater stature
while at the same time removing it from direct control by the At-
torney General. The judges of this new tribunal, both trial and
appellate levels, could be appointed by the President and con-
firmed by the Senate for fixed and staggered terms of, say, six
years. Appointments should be made at higher grades: GS-18 for
the appellate level and GS-17 for the trial level. This upgrading
17
would help to attract better-qualified applicants. Such a new
agency would be a marked improvement over the present set-up.
At the same time, certain disadvantages would still remain.
The new agency, with functions entirely adjudicatory, would still
be part of the Department of Justice, which is essentially an en-
forcement entity. As an administrative tribunal, the new agency
could not adjudicate constitutional challenges to the governing
statutes or regulations, any more than the BIA now can. In addi-
tion, the final decisions of the new agency, being administrative,
would still be subject to further review in the courts. This would
not only continue the present opportunities for delay but would
still permit different results in different localities when the re-
viewing courts disagreed.
A New Statutory Immigration Court
It seems to me that the best solution to the problem of the
proper placement of the functions now performed by immigration
judges and the BIA would be to transfer both trial and appellate
functions to a new specialized article I court. The change would
not be very drastic. The work now performed by immigration
judges is essentially judicial. They already conduct due process
hearings comparable in most respects to judicial hearings. The
Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure would not apply. Rules of the new court could conform the
practice to the needs of this specialized field of law, eliminate un-
necessary features and streamline procedures. Immigration
judges already make final decisions in the cases coming before
them, as distinguished from the merely recommended decisions
made in most cases presided over by administrative law judges.
Moreover, the issues that now arise in deportation and exclu-
sion cases are precisely the sort that have been traditionally en-
trusted to the courts. Although the proceedings themselves are
technically civil in nature, the courts are sensitive to the fact that
what is actually at stake is the freedom of an individual. Issues of
much less consequence to the parties are commonly accepted as
appropriate for judicial resolution. The jealously-guarded separa-
tion of functions principle makes for a judicial tradition of inde-
pendence that renders courts less likely than other agencies of
government to yield to political pressures. This is especially true
with respect to aliens, whom the courts have recently come to rec-
ognize as a politically powerless minority.
The appellate division of the new court could perform all the
appellate functions now committed to the BIA and would have
many additional advantages. For example, it could determine
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constitutional issues, which the BIA may not do.62 With adequate
staffing, it could permit oral argument in all parts of the country
before roving panels of the court. Having nationwide jurisdiction,
it could apply its decisions uniformly all over the country. If its
decisions were made subject to further review only by the United
States Supreme Court on certiorari, this would not only eliminate
an additional layer of review but would close the door to different
rules being applied in different parts of the country as a result of
conflicting holdings in the courts of appeals.
Set forth in the Appendix is the draft of a bill to create a United
States Immigration Court.63 Judges of the court would be ap-
pointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed
terms of fifteen years and at compensation comparable to that of
other federal judges. This change should help to attract the best
qualified candidates and a screening panel to make recommenda-
tions to the President could be suggested. While there is no pro-
vision for "grandfathering in" the present immigration judges and
BIA members, many undoubtedly would be found qualified for
the new court.
The rules of the new court could be expected to continue those
attributes of the present practice which have proved their worth
through the years. Various non-attorney specialists, found quali-
fied to appear for the nonprofit voluntary agencies long active in
this field, have been permitted to practice before immigration
judges and the BIA under the rules of the Board. The rules of the
new court would continue this practice.
As drafted, the jurisdiction of the trial division is restricted to
the types of cases now heard by immigration judges: those re-
quiring an opportunity for trial-type hearing, such as exclusion,
deportation and rescission of adjustment. The jurisdiction of the
appellate division is restricted to the types of cases now commit-
ted to the BIA, which include not only appeals from immigration
judges but also from District Directors in a limited number of ar-
eas. Additional types of cases could later be added to the court's
jurisdiction in the light of experience. Adjudications made by the
INS in proceedings not requiring trial-type hearings, on applica-
62. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
63. The bill is modeled after, and elaborates upon, one drafted by Peter Levin-
son and submitted to the Select Commission staff in an unpublished memoran-
dum dated August 18, 1980. A much more detailed and intricate draft bill had been
submitted on behalf of the organization of immigration judges.
tions not renewable in trial-type proceedings before the trial
judges of the new court, could be made directly appealable to the
court's appellate division. The naturalization function, now re-
posed in the United States district courts and selected state
courts, could be transferred to the trial division.
A court of this type would afford the litigants, alien and citizen
alike, a fair trial before a competent tribunal qualified to dispense
justice and exercise discretion without undue influence from the
enforcement officials. Any aggrieved party would have an appeal
as of right to a competent and independent appellate tribunal.
There should be little, if any, need for further judicial review.
While some may argue that such a specialized court tends ulti-
mately to identify with the enforcement agency, and that opportu-
nity for review by a court of generalist judges is imperative, this
need not be. If the judges of the new court are carefully and con-
scientiously selected, their judgments should be sufficient guaran-
tee of justice and equity.
Elimination of further review, save for certiorari in the
Supreme Court, would have a number of benefits. It would ease
the burden of the existing courts without diluting the quality of
the decisions. It would make for speedier disposition of cases and
help eliminate backlogs. It would establish uniformity of decision
throughout the United States. And further review would be un-
called for by the underlying system of independent, competent
and compassionate judges.
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APPENDIX
UNITED STATES IMHMGRATION COURT
Section L Establishment of court. There is hereby established,
under article I of the Constitution of the United States, a court of
record to be known as the United States Immigration Court. The
United States Immigration Court shall consist of an appellate di-
vision, composed of seven members (including the chief judge),
and a trial division, composed of fifty members (including the
chief judge). The chief judge and judges of the appellate division
and the chief judge and judges of the trial division shall be ap-
pointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, for terms of fifteen years. Judges of the United States
Immigration Court shall be appointed solely on the basis of
fitness to perform the duties of the office.
Section 2. Compensation of judges. Each judge of the appellate
division shall receive salary at the same rate and in the same in-
stalments as judges of the district courts of the United States.
Each judge of the trial division shall receive salary at the same
rate and in the same installments as commissioners of the United
States Court of Claims.
Section 3. Removal of judges. Judges of the United States Im-
migration Court may be removed by the President during their
terms of office only for incompetency, misconduct in office, ne-
glect of duty, or physical or mental disability. Before any order of
removal is entered by the President, he shall furnish a full specifi-
cation of the charges to the judge, who shall be accorded an op-
portunity to be heard on the charges by a panel of three judges to
be selected by the Chief Justice of the United States from among
the senior judges of three different circuits of the United States
Court of Appeals.
Section 4. Rules of court. The appellate division shall promul-
gate rules of court governing practice and procedure in the appel-
late division and in the trial division. The rules shall be designed
to accord all parties to proceedings in the trial division and in the
appellate division a fair and prompt hearing and determination.
To this end, neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply to proceedings in the
United States Immigration Court. However, selected provisions
of those Rules may be adapted and incorporated, as deemed ap-
propriate, in the rules of the United States Immigration Court.
The rules shall contain provisions for the representation of non-
government parties in proceedings before the court by counsel of
their own choice without expense to the government, as well as
by qualified nonattorneys who appear without fee or as accredited
representatives of nonprofit voluntary agencies of a religious,
charitable, social service or similar nature recognized by the court
as having at its disposal adequate knowledge, information and ex-
perience.
Section 5. Appellate division administration. The chief judge
of the appellate division shall have administrative responsibility
for the proper functioning of the appellate division and shall have
power to appoint such administrative assistants, attorneys, clerks,
and other personnel as may be needed for that purpose. In ac-
cordance with the rules of the court, the chief judge may either
designate any three appellate division judges to hear and decide
any case within the jurisdiction of the appellate division or may
refer any such case to the appellate division en banc. A judge of
the trial division, pursuant to designation of the chief judge of the
appellate division in accordance with rules of the court, may sit
temporarily in place of a judge of the appellate division. The ap-
pellate division shall have its headquarters office in Washington,
D.C. and shall hear oral argument there in accordance with its
rules. From time to time, at such intervals as may be deemed ap-
propriate in the judgment of the chief judge of the appellate divi-
sion, a panel or panels of three judges of the appellate division
may travel to other areas of the United States outside the head-
quarters office for the purpose of hearing oral argument in cases
arising in those areas.
Section 6. Appellate division jurisdiction. The appellate divi-
sion shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from
final decisions of judges of the trial division. The appellate divi-
sion shall also have jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals
from final decisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice in the following types of proceedings: (1) administrative fines
and penalties under sections 231, 233, 237, 239, 243, 251, 254, 255,
256, 271, 272, and 273 of the Immigration and Nationality Act; (2)
applications for the exercise of the discretionary authority con-
tained in section 212(c) and section 212(d) (3) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act; and (3) applications for classification as im-
mediate relatives under section 201(b) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act and for preference classification under section
203 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The appellate divi-
sion shall also have power to direct that any determination of a
judge of the trial division or of the Immigration and Naturaliza-
[VOL. 18: 1, 1980] Specialized Statutory Immigration Court
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
tion Service within the appellate jurisdiction of the appellate divi-
sion be certified to .it for review and final determination. In
considering and determining cases before it, the appellate divi-
sion shall exercise such discretion and authority conferred upon
the Attorney General by law as is appropriate and necessary for a
just and equitable disposition of the case.
Section 7. Trial division administration. The chief judge of the
trial division shall have administrative responsibility for the
proper functioning of the trial division and shall have power to
appoint such administrative assistants, attorneys, clerks and
other personnel as may be needed for that purpose. In accor-
dance with the rules of the court, the chief judge of the trial divi-
sion may designate any trial division judge to hear and decide any
case falling within the jurisdiction of the trial division.
Section 8. Trial division jurisdiction. The trial division shall
have jurisdiction to hear and determine the following types of
cases: (1) exclusion cases under section 236 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act; (2) deportation cases under section 242 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act; and (3) rescission of adjustment
of status cases under section 246 of the Immigration and National-
ity Act. In considering and determining cases coming before
them, the trial division judges shall determine all applications for
discretionary relief which may properly be raised in the proceed-
ings, including determinations relating to bond, parole or deten-
tion of an alien in such proceedings, and shall exercise such
discretion conferred upon the Attorney General by law as is ap-
propriate for the just and equitable disposition of the case.
Section 9. Savings provisions. The enactment of this Act shall
not result in any loss of rights or powers, interruption of jurisdic-
tion, or prejudice to matters pending in the Board of Immigration
Appeals or before special inquiry officers (immigration judges) on
the day that this Act shall take effect. Under rules to be promul-
gated by the appellate division, with respect to such pending
cases the appellate division shall be deemed to be a continuation
of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the trial division shall
be deemed to be a continuation of special inquiry officers (immi-
gration judges) for the purpose of effectuating the continuation of
all existing rights, powers, and jurisdiction. Pending promulga-
tion of those rules, the Board of Immigration Appeals and the
special inquiry officers (immigration judges) shall continue to
function with such jurisdiction and powers as exist on the day
that this Act is enacted.
Section 10. Finality of decision. A final decision of the appel-
late division shall be binding on all judges of the trial division and
on all officers of the United States, and shall be subject to further
review only by the Supreme Court of the United States on peti-
tion for certiorari.
